Ahmadinejad, Israel and Obama’s Iran Puzzle

Ramzy Baroud – Palestinechronicle
June 19, 2009

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Ahmadinejad’s victory will serve as ‘proof’ that diplomacy with Iran is not an option.

The election victory of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is likely to complicate US President Barack Obama’s new approach to his country’s conflict with Iran. The reason behind the foreseen obstacle is neither the US nor Iran’s refusal to engage in future dialogue but rather Israel’s insistence on a hard-line approach to the problem.

Iran’s presidential elections on June 12 were positioned to represent another fight between Middle Eastern ‘moderates’ vs. ‘extremists’. That depiction, which conveniently divided the Middle East – according to the prevailing US foreign policy discourse – to pro-American and anti-American camps was hardly as clear in the Iranian case as it was in Palestine and most recently in Lebanon.

Ahmadinejad’s main rival, Mir Hussein Moussavi served as Iran’s Prime Minister for 8-years (between 1981-1989) during one of Iran’s most challenging times, its war with Iraq. He was hardly seen as a ‘moderate’ then. More, Moussavi was equally adamant in his country’s right to produce atomic energy for peaceful means. As far as US interests in the region are concerned, both Ahmadinejad and Moussavi are interested in dialogue with the US, and are unlikely to alter their country’s attitudes towards the occupation of Iraq, their support of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Palestine. Neither is ready, willing or, frankly, capable of removing Iran from the regional power play at work in the Middle East, considering that Iranian policies are shaped by other internal forces beside the president of the country.

This is not to suggest that both leaders are one and the same. For the average Iranian, statements made by Ahmadinejad and Moussavi during Iran’s lively election campaigns did indeed promise major changes in their lives, daily struggles and future. But yet again, the two men were caricatured to present two convenient personalities to the outside world, a raging nuclear-obsessed man, hell-bent on ‘wiping Israel off the map”, and a soft-spoken, learned ‘moderate’ ready to ‘engage’ the West and redeem the sins of his predecessor.

Unfortunately for the Obama administration, the first negative image – tainted as such by mainstream media, and years of image manipulation by forces dedicated to the interest of Israel – won. The election outcome in Iran presents the young Obama with a major challenge: if he carries on with his diplomatic approach and soft overtures towards Iran, ruled by a supposed Holocaust-denier, he will certainly be seen as a failed president, who dared to perceive Israel’s interests in the region as secondary; on the other hand, Obama cannot depart from his country’s new approach towards Iran, a key player in shaping the contending forces in the entire region.

In some way, Ahmadinejad’s victory was the best news for Israel. Now, Tel Aviv will continue to pressure Obama to ‘act’ against Iran, for the latter, under its current president is an ‘existential threat’ to Israel, a claim that few in Washington question. “It is not like we rooted for Ahmadinejad,” an Israeli official told the New York Times on the condition of anonymity a day after it was clear that Ahmadinejad won another term in office.

But considering Israel’s immediate attempt to capitalize on the outcome of the elections makes one wonder if the defeat of Iran’s ‘moderate’ camp was not a best case scenario for Israel. Iran will continue to be presented as the obstacle in future peace in the Middle East, allowing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid any accountability as far as the ‘peace process’ is concerned. In fact, with an ‘existential threat’ not too far away, few in Washington would dare challenge Israel’s settlement policies in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, or its deadly siege on Gaza, or in fact its confrontational approach to Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the latter seen as an ‘Iranian-backed militia.’

Israeli Vice Prime Minister Silvan Shalom was one of the first top officials in Israel to exploit the moment on June 13. The results of Iran’s elections, he said, “blow up in the faces of those who thought Iran was built for a genuine dialogue with the free world on stopping its nuclear program.” Ostensibly, Shalom’s message was directed at a small audience in Tel Aviv, but his true target audience, was in fact Obama himself.

Obama’s overtures towards Iran were not necessarily an indication of a fundamental shift in US foreign policy, but a realistic recognition of Iran’s growing influence in the region, and the US’ desperate and failing fight in Iraq. It was Obama’s pragmatism, not a moral-shift in US foreign policy that compelled such statements as that made on June 2 in a BBC interview: “What I do believe is that Iran has legitimate energy concerns, legitimate aspirations. On the other hand, the international community has a very real interest in preventing a nuclear arms race in the region.”

For Israel, however, Obama’s rhetoric is a deviation from the past US hard-line approach towards Iran. What Israel wants to keep alive is a discussion of war as a viable option to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions and to eliminate a major military rival in the Middle East.

Senior fellow at the pro-Israeli American Enterprise Institute, John R. Bolton expressed the war-mongering mantra of the pro-Israel crowd in a recent article in the Wall Street Journal entitled: “What if Israel Strikes Iran?”: “Many argue that Israeli military action will cause Iranians to rally in support of the mullahs’ regime and plunge the region into political chaos. To the contrary, a strike accompanied by effective public diplomacy could well turn Iran’s diverse population against an oppressive regime.”

Ahmadinejad’s victory will serve as further proof that diplomacy with Iran is not an option, from the point of view of Israel and its supporters in the US. Whether Obama will proceed with his positive rhetoric towards Iran is to be seen. Failure to do so, however, will further undermine his country’s interests in the Middle East, and will prolong the cold war atmosphere of animosity, espoused by a clique of neoconservative hard-liners throughout the Bush administration of past years.

– Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published in many newspapers, journals and anthologies around the world. His latest book is, “The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle” (Pluto Press, London), and his forthcoming book is, “My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story” (Pluto Press, London)

During his speech on June 8, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, wanted to express his “deep hearted gratitude to all my brothers in Hezbollah and to Hezbollah supporters.” He said that during the June 7 election “there was no competition is south Lebanon and Baalbek-Hermel districts as well as Beirut’s southern suburb, but we have called on voters to have a strong presence to express their political choices and convictions, particularly with regards to the resistance issue.”

Therefore, the turnout in districts with Shiite seats and in districts where Hezbollah candidates were running was massive. Hezbollah won all 11 districts in which it fielded its 11 candidates, and along with its allies won 21 seats in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah and its allies also won 10 seats in the eastern Baalbek region.

In the South, the opposition’s victory was the hugest. In Tyr, for instance, 68,558 voted for the opposition. In contrast, the loyalty could not get more than 1,686 votes. In Nabatieh, the loyalty bloc only got 3,000 votes compared to 58,985 for the opposition. In Hasbayya, 48,648 voted cast their ballot in favor of the opposition. However, only 12,056 voted for the loyalty.

In the eastern district of Baalbeck-Hermel the opposition alliance ticket got 105,756 votes. The others only got 14,283 votes. On the whole, the alliance between Hezbollah and AMAL got 92% of the Shiite vote. This proves the existence of an almost complete identification between the resistance organizations and the Shiite community in Lebanon.

This reality belies Israeli claims linking the achievement of a parliamentary majority by the loyalty bloc with the July 2006 war. For example, Likud MK in Israeli Knesset and former Israeli occupation army Spokeswoman Miri Regev said that “Hezbollah’s loss” in the Lebanese parliamentary elections should be considered a direct result of the conflict. Clearly, Regev and other Israeli political and military officials have tried to find a new argument to cover their complete defeat and humiliation in that war.

If such claims were true, Hezbollah would have suffered a severe defeat in the Shiite areas in the South, Baalbeck-Hermel and Beirut’s southern suburb which were the most attacked during the conflict. However, the reality is just the opposite. People in these areas voted massively for the resistance and in a referendum on Hezbollah’s arms. With their turnout and vote, they told the world that these arms are there to protect them and make them feel safe and that their support for the Resistance is unshakable.
Residents in the south remember how the Resistance defeated the Israeli army and liberated this part of the country in 2000 -when Ehud Barak was the Israeli primer minister- following a 22-year occupation. In July 2006, Hezbollah’s fighters once again curbed another Israeli large offensive in the South. At that time, many residents joined the ranks of the Resistance and fought Zionist troops in their own areas.

They also know that Israel has neither forgiven nor forgotten these defeats. For Israelis, the war against Lebanon and Hezbollah did not end in 2000 or in 2006 but it continues today, although in different form. And this explains why Israel has been busy setting up numerous espionage cells in Lebanon as Mossad networks are being dismantled in coordination between Lebanese security forces and the Resistance.

Hezbollah has never been a sectarian organization. It has promoted dialogue and understanding among the different communities in Lebanon (Christians, Sunnis, Shiites and Druze). However, it was created by members of the Shiite community and mainly represents members of this religious group.
Together with the protection that it receives from Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite community has also many other reasons to feel identified with the organization, which has helped Shiites, currently 41% of the Lebanese population, recover their political rights, pride and dignity since its foundation in 1982.

Shiites had been traditionally marginalized in the country’s political and economic life. Maha, a Shiite resident of southern Lebanon, told the Jarafiya News site that her community had found pride thanks to Hezbollah: “Before we were nothing, but now we can walk with our heads held high.” “Of course I will vote for Hezbollah,” Maha said in her shoe shop in the southern town of Naqura near the border with occupied Palestine. “It has made us proud as Shiites, as residents of the south, and as Lebanese.”

On the other hand, Hezbollah has proved that it is a viable alternative to the state’s social services. It runs a large network of schools, charity organizations, clinics and hospitals. Hezbollah has helped many thousands of people who lost their homes in the July 2006 war build new houses.

Some foreign powers feel deeply disturbed by the strong link between Hezbollah and the Shiite community and have tried to weaken it. Saudi Arabia, one of the main supporters of the current government majority, has created and funded the so-called Lebanese Option Movement -led by Ahmad Al Asaad, the son of a prominent feudal southern family- in order to undermine Hezbollah’s position. However, this Saudi operation has proved unsuccessful and Shiite residents have maintained their loyalty to the resistance party.